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5 • Unifying Germany: 
Crisis, Conflict, and 
Social Partnership in the East 
Lowell Turner 
i 
W h a t W a S earlier an open question has now been resolved. 
r Social partnership, including comprehensive collective bargaining, codeter-
1 mination, influential unions, and employer associations, has been success-
fully established on new foundations in eastern Germany. This remarkable 
: outcome, and the revolution in social relations that it implies, occurred in 
an extraordinarily short period of historical time (1990-94). 
Far from a foregone conclusion, the development of modern social part-
nership relations in eastern Germany was very much in doubt in the early 
years after unification. Intelligent and well-informed observers suggested 
that a transfer of institutions from the West would not be successful, that 
employers would take advantage of new labor markets and low wages in 
the East to undermine the strength of German unions and fundamentally 
alter the German system of industrial relations, pushing toward a so-called 
Americanization—namely, deregulation and weakly organized labor (see, 
for example, Armingeon 1991 and Mahnkopf 1991 and 1993). 
I argue that social partnership is alive and well in eastern Germany. My 
evidence for this surprising outcome includes the IG Metall strike victory of 
1993 and plant-level case studies of restructuring and industrial relations in 
the metal and electronics industries of eastern Germany. The success of 
social partnership in eastern Germany can be traced both to the flexible 
Funding for this research was provided by the German Marshall Fund of the United States; 
the Institute of Collective Bargaining, the Institute of European Studies, and the Center for 
Advanced Human Resource Studies, all three at Cornell University; and the Wissenchaftszen-
trum in Berlin. Many thanks to Michael Fichter, Charles Heckscher, Richard Locke, and 
Kathleen Thelen for detailed comments on earlier drafts. 
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suitability of institutions transferred from the West and to the actor choices 
in the negotiations and conflicts that have made it possible to adapt these 
institutions to a new environment. Both the institutional and political as-
pects of the argument are necessary to explain the success of social partner-
ship in eastern Germany. 
This issue is important not only for what it tells us about the political 
economy of unified Germany but also for the theoretical and practical les-
sons we can draw about institutional transfer, adaptation, and reinvigora-
tion. In spite of extraordinary dislocation and hardship among its 
population, eastern Germany now appears well on the road to economic 
prosperity and democratic stability. This outcome, however, can be ex-
plained neither by the coming of a market economy in itself nor by markets 
combined with institutional transfer from the former West Germany under 
the terms of the unification treaty. Markets always require appropriate 
institutional regulation (Polanyi 1957; Hall 1986); at the same time, it is 
quite clear that institutions cannot be directly transferred from one area or 
society to another without being modified to fit local circumstances. New 
institutions, whether imported or locally developed, must build on the lega-
cies and remnants of existing institutions and practices (Stark 1992). Both 
the case studies and the strike story presented here demonstrate how the 
West German institutions of social partnership have built successfully on 
earlier and existing practices in eastern Germany. 
When institutions adapt to new circumstances, both are changed. This mu-
tual process of influence and change, even in the one-sided process of unifica-
tion, points to a broader conclusion: institutional expansion, transfer, and 
adaptation to new circumstances leads to institutional change. Such a process 
of change, although painful, may result in institutional reinvigoration or even 
reinvention; if it does not, the alternative may well be stagnation and decline. 
Institutional expansion and adaptation to new circumstances, although 
necessary, are also risky. While social partnership is now newly established 
in eastern Germany, the necessary adaptations (similar to what Stark 1994 
calls "recombination") exert pressure for change within the broader western 
and all-German institutions. The contours of such change are only dimly 
apparent at present. Whether the pressure for change will result in institu-
tional reinvigoration or institutional decline for German social partnership 
remains to be played out in political processes of conflict and negotiation. 
THE STRIKE OF 1993 
The first great watershed for German social partnership in the post-
unification era came in the spring of 1993, when employers in the metal 
industries of eastern Germany unilaterally imposed a pay raise smaller than 
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I the one they had contractually agreed to pay. IG Metall responded by 
I calling eastern workers out on strike in a high-stakes effort to beat back the 
l employer offensive and demonstrate its influence in the new states of Ger-
i many. The ensuing conflict was to have major consequences for the future 
of industrial relations in eastern Germany.1 
Background 
In March 1991, Gesamtmetall (the metal industries employers' associa-
tion) and IG Metall signed similar three-year contracts for each region of 
eastern Germany, establishing basic pay levels and terms of employment for 
blue-and white-collar workers in the metal industries, including automobile 
assembly and parts, machinery, steel, shipbuilding, and electronics. These 
contracts provided for the phasing in of nominal wage parity with western 
workers over a three-year period, from 65 percent on April 1, 1991, to 100 
percent on April 1, 1994.2 Widely praised at the time, this arrangement 
gave eastern workers hope for the future (and a reason not to move to 
the already crowded western labor market), social stability in a precarious 
economic situation, and an incentive for employers and investors to get in 
early while wage costs remained low. 
The cosy relationships of 1991, however, had evaporated by 1992 in the 
face of economic collapse in eastern Germany. Although the wage raise of 
April 1, 1992, was paid on schedule, many employers, especially small-to-
medium-sized ones, complained that the continuing phase-in of nominal 
wage parity would bring economic ruin. Gesamtmetall was worried about 
its membership density in the East, which was much lower than levels 
enjoyed in western Germany; many eastern firms were seeking to go it alone 
in hopes of working out better deals with their own threatened workforces 
(Silvia 1993, 225 Wever 1995).3 Employer criticism focused increasingly on 
the 26 percent pay raise due on April 1, 1993. 
1. Although published work is cited where appropriate, most of the facts and analysis in 
this section are based on interviews as well as participant observation conducted in eastern 
Germany in the spring of 1993. 
2. Although contracts offered eastern workers nominal wage parity in the foreseeable fu-
ture, real wage parity remained an elusive and distant goal. This was true because vacation and 
holiday schedules and other benefits were to be phased in over a longer period, because eastern 
workers were often grouped in lower pay categories than similarly employed western workers, 
and because contractual minimums negotiated in the West were typically supplemented by firm-
level premiums unavailable in the East. In the metal industries, this meant that by April 1,1993, 
when wage levels in the East were scheduled to reach 82 percent of levels in the West, real wages 
(all things considered) would reach only 56.5 percent (Bispinck 1993a, 315, 326). 
3. Precise membership data for employer associations, including meaningful density figures, 
is well-guarded. For a useful discussion of the dissatisfaction of eastern association members 
(in the employer associations as well as other interest organizations), see Wiesenthal, Ettl, and 
Bialas 1992. 
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The pressure that Gesamtmetall now felt from many eastern member 
firms dovetailed with similar pressure that had been growing in the West in 
the 1980s and early 1990s (Silvia 1994). The Mittelstand (the vast medium-
sized firm sector, which included many innovative companies using ad-
vanced technology and oriented toward export as well as domestic markets) 
had grown especially critical of Gesamtmetall (dominated by large firms 
such as Daimler-Benz and Siemens) and its bargaining agreements. Mittel-
stand firms claimed that regional agreements since 1984, which included 
wage increases, workforce protections, and a shorter work week, were 
raising costs beyond what they could afford. Some had gone so far as to 
threaten to withdraw from Gesamtmetall if the bargaining system was not 
considerably decentralized and deregulated. 
In this context, facing pressure from its own membership in both West 
and East, fearing membership losses in the West as well as a permanently 
smaller base in the East, Gesamtmetall seized an opportunity to play hard-
ball in what looked like a sure-win situation in the winter and spring of 
1993. A hard-line view came to dominate within the employers' camp: with 
40 percent real unemployment and massive job insecurity in the East, with 
no recent history of western-style collective bargaining and labor conflict, 
and with membership in IG Metall quite new for eastern workers, the 
chances for mass mobilization and a successful strike in the East looked 
slim. Here was the breakthrough opportunity that Gesamtmetall sought for 
reform of the collective bargaining system in unified Germany. If IG Metall 
could be forced to retreat or pushed into a losing conflict in circumstances 
favorable to employers, a precedent could be set for holding down labor 
costs, introducing greater flexibility for firm-level adjustments, and demon-
strating a new aggresiveness and resolve on the part of Gesamtmetall in the 
service of member interests. 
With these goals in mind, in November of 1992 Gesamtmetall called for 
a revision of the three-year contract. Under terms of the revision clause, either 
party to the agreement could open new negotiations after January 1, 1993, 
in light of changing economic and social circumstances. After much public 
posturing, negotiations began in Saxony on January 18,1993. Employers de-
manded cancellation of the three-year contract and its Stufenplan (phased-in 
wage parity); a one-year contract that would raise wages 9 percent in eastern 
Germany on April 1, instead of the scheduled 26 percent; and a new "opening 
clause" (Offnungsklausel) to allow renegotiation at the firm level for employ-
ers unable to pay scheduled wage increases (Bispinck 1993b, 471-75). 
IG Metall rejected these demands and asked for evidence to show how 
many firms could not pay the scheduled increase. Refusing to provide such 
information, Gesamtmetall declared the negotiations at an impasse on Janu-
ary 25 and called for arbitration. At the same time, the employers made it 
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clear they would not accept an arbitrated settlement that exceeded their 
proposed 9 percent pay raise revision for April 1.4 
On February 15, arbitration proceedings ended in Saxony without a 
formal recommendation. The chief arbitrator cited irreconcilable differ-
ences caused by inadequate industrial and monetary policies and an eco-
nomic transformation that had completely overtaxed the capabilities of the 
bargaining parties. Similar, patterned outcomes occurred in bargaining and 
arbitration proceedings in the other eastern German bargaining districts. 
On February 18, the employers' association in Saxony announced the can-
cellation of the contract and demanded new negotiations with the union, 
1 based on the employer demand for a 9 percent raise, with downward adjust-
I ments possible under an opening clause. In the event that no new agreement 
I was reached, the employers announced their intention to proceed unilater-
I ally with a 9 percent raise on April 1. 
I IG Metall denounced the employer action as illegal and without prece-
I dent in the postwar period. Filing a formal complaint with the labor court (which was not scheduled to be heard until May 14), the union began to prepare for a strike (Bispinck 1993b, 475-76). 
J With no agreement in sight, Gesamtmetall associations in each of the 
eastern bargaining regions announced their intention to raise wages by 9 
percent on April 1; IG Metall announced warning strikes, marches, and 
demonstrations beginning that same day, to be upgraded to a full-fledged 
strike if no settlement was reached.5 Employers denounced IG Metall as 
intransigent and out of touch with a membership in desperate economic 
straits; the union accused the employers of breaking the postwar social 
contract and undermining the foundations of free collective bargaining.6 
Employers, backed by the business press and the broader employer commu-
nity (through the umbrella federation BDA), appeared unusually confident 
of victory. Eastern metalworking employees, for their part, obviously felt 
4. Each party appointed three members of an arbitration panel; these six members then 
appointed a seventh neutral member and chair. Arbitration is generally nonbinding in German 
collective bargaining, which means the results can be rejected by either party. In this case, an 
arbitrated agreement would have been binding only if five of the seven panel members had 
agreed on the settlement (Silvia 1993, 11). 
5. Unlike common practice in the United States, where strikes tend to be all or nothing, 
German unions typically build up to a strike gradually. Warning strikes can last anywhere 
from a few minutes to a full day or more and are intended to strengthen the union bargaining p sition by demons rating strike readiness and solidarity. Whe  war ing str kes do occur,negotiations typically co tinue or r sum , leading in most cases to  se tl ment prior to theon et f a full-blown strike. 6. For the employer perspective, see, for ex mple, H n elsblatt, April 6, 1993, P- 3- F° r u ion vi , s e Der Gewerk ch after, 41, no. 3 (March 1993). For a debat  b tween the twoviewpoints just prior to th first wa ning strikes, see Tag spieg l March 23, 1993, P- 2 I -
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betrayed by the unilateral reduction of their scheduled pay increases; yet 
according to numerous journalistic accounts they also appeared wary about 
going out on strike in a period of massive layoffs and economic crisis. Union 
representatives spoke militantly in public of the need to defend collective 
bargaining and free trade unionism but more hesitantly in private of their 
uncertainty regarding the viability of a strike in eastern Germany. Press 
editorials called for reason on both sides, especially exhorting IG Metall to 
avoid leading its new eastern members into a labor-market disaster. In a 
front-page editorial cartoon, Handelsblatt, Germany's leading business 
daily, showed IG Metall president Franz Steinktihler sitting at the helm of a 
small boat, steering his eastern members over the crest of a great waterfall.7 
The Economist titled its article on the coming conflict "Mass Suicide."8 
From Partnership to Open Conflict 
Highly successful warning strikes throughout the new German states on 
April 1-2 and again on April 14-15 shattered both employer expectations 
and western preconceptions of eastern worker passivity. Even Michael 
Fichter, for example, a leading Berlin-based observer of eastern German 
industrial relations since 1989, had referred to "the widespread instance of 
lethargy and passive expectation . . . after years of being watched over, 
taken care of, and having favors and social improvements—when forth-
coming—doled out to them, East Germans seem to be particularly prone 
to such behavior" (Fichter 1991, 3s).9 For Gesamtmetall, the comfortable 
illusion vanished that easterners, after sixty combined years of nazism and 
command communism, would no longer stand up for their own interests 
when forcefully challenged. For IG Metall, the demonstrative shattering of 
this same troubling preconception cast new light on the union's bargaining 
position in eastern Germany. 
For a few days, an early settlement looked possible. Kurt Biedenkopf, 
prime minister of Saxony, offered his services as a mediator, leading to 
discussions between IG Metall and employers' association (VSME in Sax-
ony) on April 4 and 5. An agreement was reached between the two sides, 
reinstating the scheduled April 1 pay raise but stretching out the timetable 
for full parity by one additional year. IG Metall headquarters in Frankfurt 
indicated its willingness to accept the compromise; Gesamtmetall headquar-
ters in Cologne, however, turned it down, forcing the Saxon employers' 
7. Handelsblatt, April 5, 1993, p. 1. 
8. The Economist, April 24, 1993, pp. 71-72. 
9. See also Mahnkopf 1991, 276-79, and Robenack and Hartung 1992. As Der Spiegel put 
it on the eve of the strike: "In the workplace, employees are profoundly insecure; fear of losing 
their jobs is paralyzing their willingness to strike" {Der Spiegel, no. 13 [1993]: 122; author's 
translation). 
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association chairman to resign his position. IG Metall pointed to this failed 
effort at compromise as evidence that Gesamtmetall's hard-line position 
was unreasonable.10 
Rumors of further behind-the-scenes discussions and possible compro-
mise solutions circulated throughout the month of April and into May. 
Publicly, however, both sides hardened their positions. The first strike votes, 
held on April 26-28, were 85 percent in favor in Saxony and 90 percent in 
favor in Mecklenburg-Pomerania. A parallel vote in the eastern steel indus-
try, also organized by IG Metall but negotiating separately, was 86 percent 
in favor (Bispinck 1993b, 477). 
The strike began in Saxony on May 3, with 7,000 workers at twenty 
workplaces, and in Mecklenburg-Pomerania on May 4, with 12,500 work-
ers from twenty-four workplaces. The union raised the numbers gradually, 
so that by the second week, 30,000 workers from seventy-five workplaces 
had joined the strike. Solidarity among the strikers, who received an average 
of DM 220-50 (about $150) per week in strike benefits from the union, 
appeared strong.11 There were no signs at all of what the employers had 
expected: an early return to work by dispirited eastern workers. 
On May 10-12, IG Metall escalated the stakes by holding strike votes in 
the rest of eastern Germany, with 81 percent in favor in Berlin-Brandenburg, 
86 percent in Saxony-Anhalt, and 85 percent in Thuringia (Bispinck 1993 b, 
477). On May 12, 400,000 workers and their supporters demonstrated 
throughout Germany in support of the strikers, including over 50,000 west-
ern workers who briefly laid down their tools in solidarity.12 On May 13, 
the IG Metall national executive board announced its decision to spread the 
strike to all of eastern Germany. By the end of the second week (May 14), 
50,000 eastern metalworkers were on strike.13 
Intensive negotiations resumed in Saxony, again with the mediation of 
Kurt Biedenkopf, finally yielding a settlement on May 14. The terms of this 
agreement served as a closely followed pattern for the other regions of 
eastern Germany and the eastern steel industry as well. The parties agreed 
to the principle of phased-in wage parity for eastern workers but established 
a new timetable. In a symbolic but important gesture for the union, the 26 
percent raise was reinstated retroactively to April 1. Effective April 16, the 
10. For an account of the early abortive settlement, see Der Spiegel, no. 19 (1993): 
114-17 . 
i i . See, for example, Andreas Oldag, "Metallerstreik in Ostdeutschland," Siiddeutscbe Zei-
tung, May 6, 1993, p. 3. 
12. Reported by IG Metall in its newsletter "Metall Nachrichten fur den Bezirk Ktiste," 
May 13, 1993. 
13. Dagmar Deckstein, "Ein fast genialer KompromiE," Suddeutsche Zeitung, May 15, 
1993, p. 4. 
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raise was dropped to 9 percent (plus anything else that individual firms had 
agreed to), then raised again in June, September, and December, so that the 
26 percent level was reached by the end of the year. Further raises in 1994-
96 were scheduled to bring wage parity between East and West by July 1, 
1996. The employers issued a statement conceding that the extraordinary 
contract cancellation, used in this case only, was not an appropriate solution 
to collective bargaining problems.14 
The union thus secured its main demands: reinstatement of the 26 percent 
pay increase, an admission by the employers that the contract cancellation 
would set no precedent for future labor conflicts, and a defense of phased-in 
wage parity for eastern workers. In addition, the union resisted the intro-
duction of an "opening clause." Most important, perhaps, the union discov-
ered in its new eastern membership a highly mobilizable force capable of 
conflict, solidarity, and personal sacrifice. 
Employers secured considerable total labor cost savings for the period 
1993-96, during the lengthened phase-in of wage parity.15 In addition, 
Gesamtmetall was able to demonstrate a new bargaining aggressiveness on 
behalf of its members, as well as provide support services during a strike, 
to help convince skeptical eastern employers to join or retain membership 
in the association. But the employers, in the end, were forced to give in to 
the central union demands, including the concept of phased-in eastern wage 
parity; and they were forced to back down in the face of unexpectedly 
determined employee militance. 
Instead of an opening clause, Gesamtmetall settled for a new "hardship 
clause." While both allow for downward wage adjustment at designated 
firms, the distinction is critical. An opening clause would put the essential 
power in the hand of firms and their works councils to negotiate lower 
wage levels. In a period of economic crisis and mass unemployment, works 
councils would find themselves under great pressure to make substantial 
concessions. A hardship clause, on the other hand, puts the essential power 
of approval in the hands of a union-employer commission, giving IG Metall 
effective veto power. While the employers heralded this as. a breakthrough 
in the direction of greater wage flexibility, the union vowed to use the 
new instrument selectively, to monitor and control carefully all temporary 
adjustments. 
14. As reported in IDS News: "Under the settlement, the employers recognised that 
breaching the original agreement was an 'unavoidable emergency measure solely occasioned 
by the unique situation in the five new Lander. . . . Terminating collective agreements is not an 
appropriate means for resolving collective disputes' " {IDS European Report, no. 378, June 
1993, p. 5)-
15. The amount has been estimated to be as high as DM 6 billion (Silvia 1993, 13; Siid-
deutsche Zeitung, May 21, 1993, p. 1). 
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Striking workers clearly viewed the settlement as a victory. With only 25 
percent required for ratification, votes in favor totaled 78 percent in Saxony; 
61 percent in Mecklenburg-Pomerania, Thuringia, and Saxony-Anhalt; 
46 percent in Berlin-Brandenburg; and 78 percent for the eastern steel 
industry.16 
Explaining the Unexpected 
Where did the eastern workers find such unexpected resolve? Why did 
they choose to go out on strike in large numbers in a high-risk situation? 
Their interest in higher pay was clearly an important factor. Expectations 
had risen dramatically after unification; living costs had also risen rapidly 
toward western levels. Only wages had not. For similar work, easterners 
were paid far less than western workers, and the 26 percent raise scheduled 
for April 1 was seen as a major step toward parity. Wage interests alone, 
however, are not sufficient to explain the high-risk choice to strike. Union 
and worker bargaining power is typically low and the strike threat is least 
credible during periods of mass unemployment; at such times, worker mili-
tance is typically restrained, in spite of interests in higher pay (Katz and 
Kochan 1992). 
There are, therefore, two other necessary parts to the explanation for 
eastern militance. Worker mobilization in this case was fueled by extraordi-
nary passion, a product of the combined frustrations and disillusionment 
that German unification had produced for eastern Germans.17 In the rush 
to unification, easterners had been promised prosperity to go with their 
newfound freedoms. What they found instead was economic crisis, mass 
unemployment, rising costs, great job insecurity, and western employers 
and government officials taking over their land. For easterners in the metal 
industries, the unilateral employer cancellation of the scheduled pay raise 
was the last straw. The bitterness and rage of what was in some ways a 
colonized people (Knuth 1993; Baylis 1993, 87) was channeled into this 
strike, much to the benefit of IG Metall. 
The final necessary condition to explain eastern mobilization, therefore, 
16. The lower figure for the Berlin area reflects a market converging rapidly around West 
Berlin levels, with both higher living costs and greater pressure on employees to work at 
western standards. The last of the eastern regions to settle, Berlin-Brandenburg produced a 
strong union critique against the Saxon settlement, arguing for quicker wage parity in an area 
where social differences were most painfully visible (Bispinck 1993b, 477; Siiddeutsche Zei-
tung, May 19, 1993, p. 2). 
17. See, for example, Marc Fisher, "Many in East Germany Redirect Their Anger," Interna-
tional Herald Tribune, March 27-28, 1993, p. 6. See also the editorial "Politisches Warnsig-
nal" in Siiddeutsche Zeitung, May 18, 1993, p. 4; "Wir stehen unter Druck," Der Spiegel, no. 
J7 (I993)- 124-2.5; and Ferdinand Protzman, "Strike in Eastern Germany: Economics and 
Anger," New York Times, May 5, 1993, p. A3. 
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was the existence of a framework of credible institutions into which the 
passion could be funneled with reasonable prospects of success. These insti-
tutions were largely imported from the West: codetermination based on 
elected works councillors who could, in their capacity as union members, 
provide strike leadership, and a system of comprehensive regional collective 
bargaining, which included the participation of a powerful, conflict-tested 
metalworkers' union. The presence of these proven institutions, and the 
reassuring words of IG Metall that strikes were appropriate, legal, and 
winnable, provided the structure necessary for easterners to channel their 
passion into appropriate action (as opposed to either passive disillusion-
ment and withdrawal or inappropriate action such as attacks on foreigners 
or other scapegoats). 
And most important, why did IG Metall and its eastern membership win? 
The employers were certainly confident of victory, and with good reason. 
The careful analyses of perceptive academics such as Birgit Mahnkopf 
(1991,1993) and Klaus Armingeon (1991) pointed clearly toward declining 
union influence in unified Germany. If this were the case, it would hardly 
lead one to expect a major IG Metall victory in eastern Germany in 1993. 
The prevalent viewpoint, however, underestimated two important factors: 
the passion and potential militance of eastern workers, and the resilience 
and adaptability of the institutions of industrial relations in the Federal 
Republic, in particular codetermination and the system of regional collec-
tive bargaining. 
Under adverse circumstances, IG Metall won this strike because (1) it 
made the strategic and rather risky decision to strike at a time when the 
most prudent course of action might have been some face-saving compro-
mise; (2) eastern workers in large numbers made the courageous decision 
to risk future employment prospects for an issue in which they deeply 
believed (phased-in wage parity); and (3) western institutions of industrial 
relations, transplanted and adapted to conditions in the East, afforded a 
viable framework in which the strike could be fought and won. Codetermi-
nation law meant that most works councillors had received union training 
and could thus provide a union base in most plants; regional collective 
bargaining made it possible to mobilize widespread solidarity. 
For other sectors of the eastern economy, the settlement in the metal 
industries set an important pattern. In interviews in eastern Germany in 
March and April of 1993, I heard time and again from representatives of 
non-metal sectors that they were waiting to see what happened in the metal 
industry conflict. Union representatives at OTV (the public sector) and 
DPG (postal and telecommunications workers), for example, said that if IG 
Metall lost the strike, their own bargaining partners (chiefly in the Federal 
Ministry of the Interior) could be expected to follow a similar hard-line, 
f 
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union-challenging strategy. For both of those unions, comprehensive collec-
tive bargaining contracts were set to expire within a few months of the 
metal conflict. The IG Metall victory, however, led to a soft-line government 
strategy and a peaceful settlement with OTV and DPG based on phased-in 
wage parity. 
The conflict and settlement in the metal industries, in other words, were 
precedent-setting events that led to a widespread consolidation throughout 
the eastern economy of (1) nominal wage parity for eastern workers in the 
medium term, and (2) new institutions of industrial relations, including 
considerable union influence along with comprehensive, region-and sector-
based collective bargaining. 
Although the crisis of social partnership was far from over, this strike and 
its settlement greatly increased the prospects for continuing social partner-
style relations between employers and unions in eastern Germany.18 It was 
still possible, however, that the union victory was a Pyrrhic one, a possibility 
that cannot be discounted.19 Much depends on economic and industrial 
development in eastern Germany as well as the outcome of future labor 
conflicts in both eastern and western Germany. 
CASE STUDIES IN THE METAL AND ELECTRONICS INDUSTRIES 
Evidence gathered from ten case studies in the metal and electronics 
industries in eastern Germany expands, updates, and largely confirms con-
clusions drawn from the strike of 1993.20 
Case-study evidence shows first of all a wide range of plant-level diversity 
18. In a perceptive analysis, Horst Kern (1994, 38-45) argues that what IG Metall gained 
above all from the eastern strike was credibility: a demonstration of the capacity to mobilize 
its membership that would greatly strengthen the political and economic role of the unions in 
the new German states. 
19. Note the long history in the United States and elsewhere of great labor victories fol-
lowed by prolonged periods of union decline. I am indebted both to Nick Salvatore and Jonas 
Pontusson, each of whom separately impressed upon me this point. 
zo. Case-study presentations are based on plant visits, interviews, and documents collected 
between 1990 and 1995.1 first visited Hella in Meerane and VW-Chemnitz in 1994, the other 
eight firms at least three times each between 1990 and 1995. I conducted in-depth interviews 
ranging in length from one to four hours with works councillors, managers, and union repre-
sentatives. Some of the plant visits and interviews in Berlin and Rostock I conducted alone, 
others were conducted together with Larissa Klinzing of Humboldt University. For the cases in 
Saxony, Ulrich Jiirgens of the Wissenschaftszentrum and I made research trips together to 
those plants in 1991, 1992, and again in 1994. Additional interviews were also conducted at 
several of the plants by research associates Owen Darbishire and Aline Hoffmann. Detailed 
presentations of the cases are presented in Turner forthcoming, chap. 3. The case studies were 
selected from a broader original sample, to demonstrate the full range of outcomes along a 
continuum from successful to failed adjustment (Jiirgens, Klinzing, and Turner 1993). 
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along a number of dimensions, including characteristics of the transforma-
tion, production organization, and industrial relations. For production or-
ganization, outcomes range from state-of-the-art lean production at 
Opel-Eisenach, to innovative group work at Knorr-Bremse (the former Ber-
liner Bremsenwerk), to rather traditional ("extended assembly line") pro-
duction at ABB Kraftwerke Berlin (the former Bergmann-Borsig). For 
industrial relations, outcomes range from plants with influential works 
councils backed up by strike-hardened, mobilizable workforces (Siemens 
in Rostock, VW in Mosel), to highly cooperative works councils whose 
workforces have as yet shown little interest in mobilization (Niles in Berlin, 
Opel in Eisenach), and from firms committed to the employers' association 
and comprehensive collective bargaining (VW in Mosel) to nonmember, 
weakly unionized firms (Hella in Meerane). 
Although a similar range of diversity exists in western Germany, the 
diversity appears considerably more pronounced in the East. Cases that 
would be outliers in the West are less unusual in the East; it is, in fact, 
difficult to find a real mainstream in the new federal states. There are, 
nonetheless, observable patterns of economic development and industrial 
relations that can be clearly discerned in the case studies considered here. 
Findings: Partnership and Modernization 
The most important observation to emerge from the case studies is 
the following: in a very short period of time (five years), a solid base for 
long-term, stable relations of social partnership has developed in eastern 
Germany. 
Employer associations, despite low membership density relative to the 
West and intensive internal debate regarding strategy, have established a 
base for future growth and negotiation. Almost all large, influential firms in 
the East are members, and the associations play the key role from the 
employer side in setting wage standards at both sector and regional levels. 
Most of the managers interviewed indicated that their firms were committed 
members of the appropriate association. Employer solidarity, they main-
tained, was especially important in the difficult circumstances of the East; 
they viewed comprehensive collective bargaining by strong employer associ-
ations as the best way to prevent cutthroat and self-defeating labor-market 
competition and to maintain the high standards, quality, and profits for 
which German industry in the West has been known. All managers inter-
viewed, even at nonmember Hella, fully expected the associations to occupy 
the same prominent position in the East that they have occupied in recent 
decades in the West. 
There also appeared to be a solid base for the continuing development of 
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union influence in eastern Germany. At the case-study firms, union member-
ship levels for the most part equaled or exceeded membership levels at 
comparable western firms. In some cases, membership density was consider-
ably higher, as at the electronics firms Siemens and El Pro. The two low-
density cases were Hella (a small firm, most of which are also low-density 
in the West) and Opel-Eisenach (a special case, at which unionization was 
nonetheless on the rise). In all of these cases except Hella, the works coun-
cils were dominated by members of IG Metall. At several of these compa-
nies, strike preparations (or the actual strike itself) had strengthened union 
influence among the workforce; even where this had not occurred (as at 
Niles and VW-Chemnitz), works councillors remained committed union 
members and promoted union membership among the rank and file. In 
almost every case, works councillors, unionists, and managers predicted 
future high rates of unionization at their firms. 
These findings offer a quite different perspective when set against the 
many pessimistic speculations on the future of unions, employer associa-
tions, and social partnership in eastern Germany (Mahnkopf 1991; Armin-
geon 1991; Wiesenthal, Ettl, and Bialas 1992). In fact, the future does not 
look at all bad for unions and employer associations here, at least at the 
firm level. True, many small and medium-sized employers do not belong to 
the association and set their own pay levels. As the economy of the East 
improves and as firm earnings rise, however, there is little reason to think 
that these nonmember firms will forgo the considerable benefits of member-
ship (including legal advice, strike support, market information, and busi-
ness contacts). For employees, the strike of 1993 has ensured a strong base 
of union support among both rank and file and works councils in the metal 
and electronics industries. 
Comprehensively organized collective bargaining remains the primary 
mechanism for wage setting in eastern Germany and shows no signs of 
losing this role. Since plant premiums are less in the economically backward 
East, regional contracts bear an even closer relation to actual pay and other 
standards than is typically the case in the West. Where employers undercut 
bargained wage levels (sometimes with works council consent), contractual 
standards remain the benchmark for downward adjustment as well as the 
stated goal of works councils for the coming years when the crisis passes 
and economic growth resumes. 
Relations of social partnership are thus already strongly entrenched in 
negotiations between unions and employer associations. At the firm level, 
works councils are at least as likely (and in many cases more likely) than in 
the West to work cooperatively and flexibly with management in the interest 
of firm survival. Works councils at the case-study firms are highly unionized 
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(and this is typical throughout the East among larger firms in the metal and 
electronics industries); the works council-union-management social partner-
ship appears firmly established at the level of the individual employer. 
A second critical finding apparent from the case studies is the existence 
in the mid-1990s of a strong base for the modernization of industry in 
eastern Germany. Innovations at eastern plants include group work; aspects 
of lean production, including just-in-time parts delivery; and the latest tech-
nology. In the fight for survival, works councils collaborate closely with 
management in the introduction of innovation; in many cases, the works 
councils have pushed management (the reverse of the more usual case) to 
invest in new methods and to remove or reeducate authoritarian-minded 
"old red socks" who stand in the way of modern, participatory relations. In 
eastern Germany, firms found greenfield and semi-greenfield opportunities 
to introduce innovations more easily than in the industrially established 
West. They also found skilled workforces eager to accept innovation in the 
drive to keep plants open and preserve jobs. 
Whether the strong base for modernization in eastern Germany becomes 
the dominant economic reality there depends on many factors, ranging from 
world and European economic conditions, to German federal and regional 
economic policy, to the outcomes of future collective bargaining rounds. 
From the evidence presented here, however, a strong case can be made to 
support the predictions of eastern managers and works councillors that 
over the next ten to twenty years, the new federal states will become the 
most modern part of the German economy. The strong base for moderniza-
tion developed in only five years offers evidence to contradict widely pessi-
mistic predictions regarding economic development in eastern Germany 
(see, for example, Grabher 1992). 
The third key finding from case-study evidence concerns the important 
role played in modernization and economic development by legacies of 
industrial and social organization from the former GDR. David Stark has 
shown how the inherited form of industrial organization begets contrasting, 
"path-dependent" processes of privatization in Poland, Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, and eastern Germany (Stark 1992). Thus the Treuhand as a 
unique organizational form and approach to privatization has roots in the 
industrial structure (and concentration) of the GDR. In similar fashion, the 
evidence considered here demonstrates a clear relationship between older 
shopfloor practices and the potential for particular kinds of modern produc-
tion organization. Modern shopfloor teamwork in eastern Germany, where 
management is astute enough to develop it, builds at least indirectly on 
former traditions of collective work and improvisation. Such innovation-
suitable traditions arise not so much from formal brigade structures as from 
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tacit opposition to (and in spite of) former authoritarian practices. As a 
response to the inefficiency of a state-run economy, for example, groups of 
workers met their norms by improvisation and collective effort in the face of 
persistent material shortages and obsolete equipment (Voskamp and Wittke 
1991; Kern 1991). Habits bred by years of common effort and adaptation 
in difficult circumstances provide fertile ground in the 1990s for the intro-
duction of modern group and teamwork. This potential is well illustrated 
by successful innovations in production organization at Knorr-Bremse, 
Opel-Eisenach, VW-Mosel, VW-Chemnitz, and Hella, among others. 
"Old red socks" in management, on the other hand, are a human legacy 
that is more mixed in its blessing. Firms in the East have built on this legacy 
for want of a viable alternative. On the negative side, former communist 
managers need training in cost-benefit analysis, human resource manage-
ment, and modern relations with employees. Works councillors at several 
firms complained about inherited authoritarian bosses and their inability to 
work in a spirit of cooperation and trust either with the works councils or 
with other employees. On the positive side, however, such individuals do 
have experience in leadership and organization, they often possess consider-
able shopfloor knowledge by virtue of past apprenticeships and other tech-
nical training and on-the-job experience, and most important, they are 
desperate to hang on to their jobs and thus will do just about anything top 
management asks. Where top management has related to the old red socks 
strategically, such individuals have been sifted through, the bad ones sorted 
out, and the remaining core retrained to work in a facilitating role (rather 
than a commanding one) for shopfloor and office teams. This takes a major 
effort on the part of management, but it can pay off, as for example at 
Knorr-Bremse, VW-Chemnitz, and Hella. In successful cases, retrained old 
red socks bring (1) a powerful desire to adapt; (2) technical and managerial 
skills; and (3) a past practice of collaboration with eastern shop and office 
employees. This is a legacy on which the best firms can build in the push 
toward modern work organization. 
Another important legacy can be found in the employment and training 
companies (ETCs) that have been spun off from several of the case-study 
firms (Knuth 1993; Jlirgens, Klinzing, and Turner 1993, 240-41). In these 
cases, displaced employees using available plant space and surplus equip-
ment are combined in a government-subsidized nonprofit company that 
provides jobs and training while performing necessary infrastructure tasks 
such as demolition and environmental cleanup. In the best cases, led by 
"unleashed" ambitious and entrepreneurial former skilled workers, these 
companies have in turn spun off small private firms that have survived to 
provide permanent jobs and even production innovations in the new market 
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economy. The jury is still out on the ETCs, and whether the latter successful 
cases are more than isolated exceptions. At the very least, the ETCs have 
provided one-to-three more years of employment for displaced workers 
who then enter the ranks of the unemployed; at best, ETCs, especially 
when adequately funded (the main struggle for these bodies), have afforded 
bridges to future skills, employment, and even new firms and product or 
process innovation. 
In addition to the above findings, each of which offers some grounds for 
an optimistic assessment of developments in the eastern economy, the evi-
dence examined also shows major problems and potential obstacles on the 
road to a modern social-partnership economy. Employer associations, as 
we have seen, are undersubscribed; unions are losing membership, largely 
as a result of unemployment but also in some cases as a product of disillu-
sionment; and works councils in many cases, although working closely with 
management and gaining some input, are weak in the capacity to mobilize 
the workforce and develop independent negotiating positions. Pessimistic 
analysts take each of these problems as indicators of the demise of employer 
associations, unions, and social partnership. An alternative interpretation, 
however, more in line with the evidence presented here, views such problems 
as indicators of transformation and institutional adaptation, quite possibly 
on the road to a modern economy regulated by strong social partners. 
Other problems, however, may well prove more intractable and poten-
tially destabilizing for social partnership in the East. For one thing, although 
this was not the case at any of the case-study firms, managers and works 
councillors told us repeatedly of other firms in the area that were paying at 
below contractual levels, with the agreement of their own works councils. 
In some cases, firms had dropped out of the employers' association (or 
never joined) in order to do this; in other cases, firms were doing this 
illegally in spite of association membership. In the latter cases, the union 
was reluctant to take legal action, since the better political solution lay in 
developing a union-conscious works council rather than fighting against an 
agreement to which elected works councillors had consented. 
There is no doubt that this practice is currently widespread throughout 
eastern Germany (and has also become a problem in western Germany). 
Possible interpretations, however, vary. Does this phenomenon represent 
the beginning of the end for comprehensive collective bargaining led by 
strong employer associations and unions—the pessimistic and perhaps 
prevalent view? Or does this subcontractual wage-setting reflect a tempo-
rary adaptation and informal flexibility in a period of crisis and transforma-
tion? Considerable evidence supports the latter view: the continuing 
unionization of works councils that make such agreements; the consistent 
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claim on the part both of works councils and management that such "ad-
justments" are only temporary, to save jobs in desperate circumstances; and 
the willingness of union and employer association to look the other way. 
Sources within IG Metall, in fact (off the record), view such firms as poten-
tial sites for future union mobilization, if and when employers betray the 
promise and attempt to make these "temporary" adjustments permanent. 
The most serious problem for social partnership and modernization in 
eastern Germany is clearly deindustrialization, and the possibility that in-
dustry in the East will never recover from its dramatic collapse of 1991-92. 
It is difficult to imagine strong unions and employer associations in the 
absence of a substantial industrial base. Deindustrialization, with its corres-
ponding mass unemployment, has indeed been the primary source of union 
membership decline in eastern Germany since 1992. The cases we have 
looked at, on the other hand, show potentially successful and innovative 
firms that may well attract future investment and contribute to processes of 
industrial recovery. Much depends here on government economic policy, 
levels of public and private investment, and the capacity of the social part-
ners to continue to negotiate compromise agreements that set the frame-
work for stability and expansion. 
A final problem, linked directly to the preceding one, is continuing and 
long-term mass unemployment. In every case study, people related 
wrenching stories of almost unbelievable downsizing and mass layoffs. The 
firms that survived sell-off by the Treuhand did so with a fraction of their 
previously employed workforce. It is no secret that many of the displaced 
have no hope of future employment. For older workers and for many 
women forced out of the workforce into early retirement or long-term 
unemployment, the injustice and trauma of dislocation are extreme. The 
instability of mass unemployment is thus a potentially dangerous cost of 
rising productivity in eastern Germany. Not only does mass unemployment 
result in heavy and long-term fiscal burdens on the welfare state, massive 
dislocation opens the door for demagogery and right-wing terrorism against 
foreign or domestic scapegoats. Mass unemployment, in other words, 
whether in the East or West, threatens the fabric of postwar German demo-
cratic stability. 
Once again the question arises whether these problems pose a long-term 
danger or represent temporary outrageous behavior in a period of profound 
dislocation. The answer depends in part on the speed with which economic 
growth takes off in the East; to that extent, the evidence of modernization 
examined here offers grounds for hope. The answer also depends, however, 
on the ability of the social partners, and especially the unions, to channel 
frustration and protest in constructive directions. Here again, the strike of 
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1993 gives us reason to take an optimistic perspective. The danger of social 
instability in unified Germany, however, should not be underestimated. 
SOCIAL PARTNERSHIP: RESILIENCE AND ADAPTATION IN 
EASTERN GERMANY 
Evidence from other sectors supports conclusions drawn from the metal 
and electronics industries: social partnership is alive and well in eastern 
Germany; employer associations and unions have established comprehen-
sive collective bargaining coverage that looks likely to endure; both em-
ployer associations and unions appear to have solid bases for present and 
future membership; eastern Germany appears well poised for future eco-
nomic growth and modernization in both manufacturing and services.21 
Although membership density is lower for employer associations in the 
East than in the West, most large firms belong. The associations have estab-
lished offices and a network of services, and have taken an aggressive stance 
in pursuit of broadly acceptable collective bargaining agreements. Union 
membership density, by contrast, is higher in most sectors in the East than 
in the West and appears likely to remain so.22 Unions across a range of 
sectors have established solid membership bases that include most elected 
works and personnel council (the public-sector equivalent of the works 
council) members, who have in turn been trained in codetermination rights 
by the unions. While the building of effective shop-steward-based, plant-
level union organization proceeds slowly, some progress has been made, 
especially at large plants. Successful labor conflicts and bargaining out-
comes, above all in the metal industry, have helped to establish a workplace 
base for union influence. 
While economic collapse, deindustrialization, and mass unemployment 
have taken an enormous economic and personal toll, there is important 
evidence of modernization. Innovations in many cases surpass standard 
practice in the West, including new technology (new machinery in the fac-
tories; the installation of a state-of-the-art fiber optic network for eastern 
21. See also Soskice and Schettkat 1993 and Wever 1995. For additional sector studies, see 
Silvia 1993 and Fichter 1991 and 1993. In addition to the case studies in metals and electron-
ics, my associates and I also conducted interviews in 1993-94 in the chemical industry, the 
public sector, and postal services and telecommunications, which together reinforced findings 
from the pattern-setting metal industries. Particularly striking was the extent to which repre-
sentatives on both sides of the labor-management divide in other sectors watched events in the 
metal industries, and especially the strike of 1993, f° r indications of their own future bar-
gaining prospects. 
22. As of December 31, 1992, eastern members accounted for 30.8 percent of the total 
membership of the DGB unions at a time when eastern population and workforce were about 
20 percent of the German total (Kittner 1994, 85-86). 
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telecommunications); and innovative production organization (semiautono-
mous group work, just-in-time supplier relations). Sectoral evidence shows 
a potentially solid base for economic take-off in the East. 
Although numerous small and medium-sized employers may be under-
cutting established bargaining standards, this is likely to be a temporary 
phenomenon in a very difficult period of adjustment, tolerated in the short 
run by both unions and employer associations. Collective bargaining cover-
age is well established throughout the eastern economy, setting standards 
that are widely followed or at the very least used as benchmarks. While 
employer association membership is lower in the East than in the West (and 
also appears set to remain so), most large firms and many medium-sized 
firms in eastern Germany belong to the associations and themselves engaged 
in ongoing recruiting efforts to expand membership.23 
The most serious problem for modernization in eastern Germany is dein-
dustrialization. The "industrial core" has dropped to a dangerously low 
level, beyond which the necessary networks and infrastructure for the 
expansion of modern industry may no longer be available. On the other 
hand, the skills base is substantial in eastern Germany, contributing to a 
steady rise in productivity. When viewed next to comparable areas such as 
Northern Ireland, where great effort has been expended to develop industry, 
"underlying productivity" has risen considerably more rapidly in eastern 
Germany (Hitchens, Wagner, and Birnie 1993). Given access to western 
capital, the transfer of an institututional framework from western Germany, 
and a solid human capital base in the East, the possibility is strong for 
rapid growth in spite of rising wages.24 Major sources of rising productivity 
include new work organization, retraining, increased intensity of work, and 
new plant and technology (Wagner, Hitchens, and Birnie 1994). Although 
far from a foregone conclusion, there is still a very real possibility that the 
prediction of eastern managers and works councillors will come true: that 
the East will in time become the most modern part of Germany.25 
23. Parallel to the sector-level evidence presented here, Razeen Sally and Douglas Webber 
(1994) present macro-level evidence on the Solidarity Pact negotiations of 1992-93, and 
Webber (1994) analyzes the policies of the Treuhand, both of which demonstrate a "resurgence 
of the German model," including an active political and economic role for unions and em-
ployer associations. See also Wever 1995 on the intensification of "negotiated adjustment" in 
eastern Germany. 
24. At thirty-two case-study plants in eastern Germany, Hitchens, Wagner, and Birnie 
(1993, 79-82) found that underlying productivity rose 50 percent in a one-year period, from 
June 1990 to June 1991. 
25. Kern (1994) argues that the unions are now in a position to play a major role in both 
eastern and western Germany in promoting industrial policy and the renewal of the German 
production model, as an important contribution toward future economic development in both 
East and West. 
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EXPLAINING RESILIENCE 
Three factors in particular stand out as most persuasive in explaining the 
consolidation and resilience of social partnership in eastern Germany. First, 
the transfer of institutions from West to East has provided an important 
framework or superstructure for social partnership in the East. Employer 
associations, industrial unions, comprehensive collective bargaining, elected 
works councils, and legally mandated codetermination have all been trans-
ferred from western to eastern Germany. In the absence of this institutional 
apparatus, it is difficult to imagine the rapid consolidation of cohesive and 
encompassing interest groups that could engage in meaningful bargaining 
relationships (and indeed no such consolidation has occurred in other east-
ern European countries where institutional transfer is not the case). Works 
councils, unions, employer associations, individual employers—all have 
used collective bargaining or codetermination channels to promote their 
interests and negotiate settlements. 
Second, this institutional apparatus has taken root in the remnants of the 
old system; the institutions, in other words, have proven compatible with 
and adaptable to the existing historical legacy. The combination of inherited 
skills and a tradition of informal, common workplace effort (itself in part a 
response to dysfunctional authoritarian relations in the old system), for 
example, has provided a base both for modern production innovations such 
as teamwork and for works council and union solidarity and activism. In 
the new soil, however, the institutions have changed. In the common strug-
gle for survival and the protection of remaining jobs, for example, works 
councils cooperate closely with management—more so than in the West— 
while at the same time pursuing close union-works council relations. Unions 
collaborate with employers in the building of new institutions, such as the 
widespread Employment and Training Companies at the firm level (Knuth 
1993) and broader industrial policy efforts at the Land level (such as 
Atlas in Saxony; Kern 1994). The extent to which such innovations indi-
cate long-lasting institutional recombination or change remains an open 
question. 
Finally, within the framework set by institutional transfer and historical 
legacy, actors have made choices that have promoted social partnership. At 
the plant and firm level, employees and elected works councillors have 
decided overwhelmingly to join unions, and in many cases to give active 
support to union-led campaigns when called upon to do so. At the industry 
level, metal and electronics workers quite surprisingly chose to back a risky 
strike that consolidated the position of pattern-setting IG Metall in eastern 
Germany. Large employers, for their part, have chosen to belong to appro-
priate employer associations and to give their backing to comprehensive 
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collective bargaining. At the same time, the militance of small and medium-
sized employers, many of them not members of the associations, has pushed 
employer associations to take the offensive in collective bargaining. This 
latter choice (one among a menu of possibilities) has in turn resulted in (1) 
contractual adjustments and innovations, including the lengthening of the 
time period for phased-in wage parity, that made social partnership more 
affordable in the East; and (2) a solidaristic labor response that has consid-
erably strengthened the position of unions in the East. 
Social partnership, in other words, has established itself in eastern Ger-
many because of appropriate institutions (transferred in from the West), the 
flexible adaptation of these institutions to existing historical legacies, and 
the choices that individuals and organizations have made to support, 
stretch, and work within these given channels. The evidence points to each 
of these as necessary conditions for the consolidation and resilience of social 
partnership in the East. 
For proponents of social partnership, however, the story does not neces-
sarily have a happy ending. As an important component of market regula-
tion in the new Germany, social partnership now finds itself saddled with 
the imperative to solve enormous problems and meet high expectations. 
Widespread and at this point inevitable dissatisfaction in the East, which in 
1993 IG Metall was able to channel into a winning strike effort, could just 
as easily in the future take shape as dissatisfaction with the accomplish-
ments of unions and employer associations, and the framework agreements 
they have negotiated. If the major economic and social problems facing 
unified Germany are not solved by existing actors operating withing the 
given institutional framework, the expansion of social partnership to east-
ern Germany could be the beginning of its end. 
Institutional expansion, certainly in the contemporary German case, re-
quires institutional change in order to solve new problems. Such change can 
be a source of institutional reinvigoration—as, for example, dissatisfied 
eastern members, with higher percentages of white-collar employees and 
women, push for organizational reform within the unions. If, on the other 
hand, change and reinvigoration are resisted or fail, expansion can lead to 
organizational decline. Although the extension of modern relations of social 
partnership into eastern Germany is no longer in question, the future suc-
cess of this mode of market regulation remains unknown. The institutions 
of social partnership will either find new life, reinvigoration, and reform in 
the new Germany or, overtaxed and unable to make the necessary changes, 
they will stagnate and decline. 
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